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Book Reviews 
THE EMPIRICAL JUDICIARY 
CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS. By David L. Faigman. 1 
Oxford University Press. 2008. Pp. xiii + 230. $65.00. 
A. Christopher Bryanr 
INTRODUCTION 
In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court sustained the 
constitutionality of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 
without overruling its decision seven years earlier invalidating a 
nearly identical Nebraska law.3 In doing so, the Court sided with. 
though conspicuously did not defer to, Congress·s factual finding 
that the banned procedure was virtually never medically neces-
sary, rejecting the contrary conclusion of all six lower federal 
courts confronted with challenges to the federal law. The ruling 
shone a spotlight on the methods. or lack thereof. that the Court 
employs in receiving evidence and resolving disagreements 
about questions of legislative facts in constitutional cases. 
The ruling was merely the most recent of numerous cases in 
which the result turned on disputed questions of legislative fact. 
Examples from the Supreme Court's last decade can be found in 
I. John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law. University of California. Hast-
ings College of Law. 
2. Professor. University of Cincinnati College of Law. I am grateful to Lou Bilio-
nis. Paul Caron. David Faigman. Emilv Houh. Betsv Mallm·. Bill Marshall. Tom McAf-
fee. Darrell Miller. Michael Solimine: Verna Wi!li~ms. and Ingrid Wuerth for helpful 
comments: Anna Dailev. Brennan Gravson. and Kane Kavser for excellent research as-
sistance: and the Harold C. Schott Fou~dation for financia(support. 
3. Compare Gonzales v. Carhart. 550 U.S. 124 (2007) lt'illz Stenberg v. Carhart. 530 
U.S. 914 (2000). " 
467 
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nearly every substantive area of constitutional law, including the 
dormant commerce clause, the scope of congressional power to 
regulate interstate commerce and enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the requirements of the due process and the equal 
protection clauses thereof, as well the freedoms of religion and 
expression. Moreover, the centrality of legislative facts to consti-
tutional litigation is nothing new. To some extent their signific-
ance is an inevitable corollary to judicial review, which makes all 
the more astounding the judiciary's failure to establish a consis-
tent or coherent approach to resolving questions of legislative 
fact. Over the course of the last century, few issues have more 
persistently or profoundly perplexed judges than how they 
should address questions of legislative fact when reviewing the 
constitutionality of a challenged statute. 
Nor has the subject received the kind of sustained scholarly 
investigation its import clearly merits. Though the problem is a 
ubiquitous and recurring one. scholarly efforts to solve it tend to 
come in waves, several scholars addressing the question during a 
brief span of time (often in response to one or two salient deci-
sions) and then ignoring the matter for years. But an issue that 
implicates the very legitimacy of judicial review ought not be ig-
nored. So David Faigman's Constitutional Fictions: A Unified 
Theory of Constitutional Facts merits celebration for taking up 
such an important and too-often neglected subject. 
His book should be celebrated for more than its topic, how-
ever. Constitutional Fictions does the legal profession an invalu-
able service by identifying and articulating the many frequently 
unspoken questions that arise in the context of judicial consider-
ation and resolution of facts, especially legislative facts, in consti-
tutional cases. The book also documents the largely unremarked 
ubiquity of these questions, the wide variety of circumstances in 
which they occur. and the depth of the theoretical issues they 
implicate. These are not mean achievements, as they outstrip the 
occasional efforts of some of the most distinguished legal scho-
lars of the past century. Professor Faigman accomplishes all this 
in crisp. lucid. and admirably concise prose. Nor could Professor 
Faigman's book be more timely. Several of the Roberts Court's 
most salient and controversial constitutional decisions have 
turned on questions of legislative fact. 
Constitlltional Fictions treats an important topic with im-
pressive insight and grace. But it will not be the last word on the 
subject. Professor Faigman may have planned an exhaustive 
study. but instead the subject appears to have exhausted him. 
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When Constitutional Fictions finally comes round to normative 
and prescriptive analysis of the status quo, Faigman shies away 
from the broader implications of his critique. As he acknowledg-
es, the Supreme Court has been unpardonably opaque and in-
consistent in its treatment of questions of legislative fact in con-
stitutional cases. These are not venial judicial sins. 
But Faigman proves too tolerant of the Court's disarray and 
the resulting judicial freedom from constraint. Ultimately he 
concludes that meaningful judicial review makes much of this 
indeterminacy inevitable. Implicit in this reasoning is an exces-
sively muscular conception of judicial supremacy, or even exclu-
sivity, in the implementation of the Constitution. After briefly 
reviewing Faigman's arguments, this essay explores how other 
models of the roles different institutions properly play in consti-
tutional practice might compel more sweeping changes than he 
suggests. 
Part I of this essay situates Constitutional Fictions within the 
pre-existing scholarly framework. The second Part then summa-
rizes the book's substantial contributions towards greater recog-
nition and understanding of the present doctrinal disorder con-
cerning legislative facts in constitutional cases. Part III identifies 
issues with, and alternatives to. present judicial practices not ad-
dressed in Constitutional Fictions, in the hopes of compiling a 
catalog of questions for future research. 
I. PRIOR EFFORTS 
To appreciate fully Faigman's distinctive contribution, it 
must be assessed in the context of the pre-existing treatments of 
the subject; hence this Part briefly canvases those efforts. The 
implications of judicial determination of legislative facts4 in con-
stitutional cases first garnered scholarly attention in the wake of 
the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York. 5 Lochner 
of course served as precedent for judicial disapproval of numer-
4. As used herein ... legislative facts .. are facts of general applicability that do (or 
do not) support the public policy judgment leading to the enactment of legislation. At 
least since the early 1940s. commentators and jurists have distinguished legislative from 
adjudicative facts. which concern the application of a general rule to the unique. concrete 
circumstances of a particular dispute. See. e.g .. Kenneth L. Karst. Legislative Facrs in 
Consrirllfiona/ Lirigarion. 1960 S. CT. REV. 75. 77 (noting that the ··phrase virtually be-
longs to Professor Kenneth C. Davis .. ) (citing KENNETH C. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE § 15.03 (1958) ). 
5. 198U.S.45(1905). 
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ous Progressive Era efforts to regulate wages, hours, and work-
ing conditions in an increasingly industrialized American econ-
omy.6 
In 1916 then-Harvard law professor Felix Frankfurter pub-
lished a survey of judicial rulings on the validity of laws limiting 
working hours. 7 He concluded that "study of these opinions indi-
cates a change not only in the decisions but in the groundwork of 
the decisions," adding that the "turning point comes in 1908 with 
Muller v. Oregon. "8 The future New Dealer and Supreme Court 
Justice wrote in his typically self-assured fashion. Nevertheless 
he failed to hide his fundamental ambivalence about the judicial 
determination of legislative facts in constitutional decisions. De-
scribing a trend towards greater judicial receptivity to maximum 
hours laws, which he ardently applauded, he came close to en-
dorsing a minimalist and highly deferential judicial role in ad-
dressing such matters. He noted that a chief virtue of the more 
recent rulings was that they recognized that questions concern-
ing the propriety of limits on hours of labor were matters of de-
gree "solely for the legislator. "9 
But elsewhere in the essay, Frankfurter assiduously pre-
served a substantial role for courts in re-examining the factual 
basis for such legislation. He stressed the value and necessity of 
Brandeis briefs such as those Louis Brandeis himself famously 
filed in Muller. Ultimately, he explicitly declined to choose be-
tween judicial abdication and judicial reinvestigation characte-
rized by what he described as attention to "scientific" principles: 
"either the legislative judgment should be sustained if there is no 
means of judicial determination that the legislature is indisputa-
bly wrong, or the Court should demand that the legislative 
judgment be supported by available proof." 1° Frankfurter con-
cluded his survey with an optimistic prophecy that once the fac-
tual nature of these kinds of controversies became apparent, the 
legal profession would bring to bear its formidable resources and 
resolve the conundrum in some way not yet apparent to him. Ni-
nety-three years later, Frankfurter's hopes have not been ful-
filled. 
6. See generally David A. Strauss. Why Was Lochner Wrong?. 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
373. 373-74 (2003). 
7. Felix Frankfurter. Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitwiona/ Law. 29 
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1916). 
8. /d. at 362 (citing Muller v. Oregon. 208 U.S. 412 (1908)) (footnote omitted). 
9. Frankfurter. supra note 7. at 367. 
10. /d. at 372. 
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To be sure, others have tried. Writing in the Harvard Law 
Review nine years deeper into the Lochner Era, Henry Wolf 
Bikle focused on cases in which the constitutionality of legisla-
tion depended upon the courts' assessment of "'some question of 
fact which the statute postulates or with reference to which it is 
to be applied." 11 Professor Bikle acknowledged that judges' legal 
expertise did not accord them any inherently greater aptitude to 
determine such questions than that enjoyed by the proverbial 
man in the street. 12 He postulated further, perhaps with Frank-
furter's earlier commentary in mind, that ··a substantial part of 
the criticism which has been leveled against [judicial review was] 
due to the fact that decisions have been made which turn on the 
resolution of these underlying questions of fact. " 13 
After listing the various ways, ranging from a priori reason-
ing to reliance on findings made by state supreme courts, that 
the U.S. Supreme Court had resolved such questions, Bikle 
urged the Court to uphold statutes unless the formal record of 
judicial proceedings included proof of facts showing the law to 
be unconstitutional. 14 Recognizing that scrupulous adherence to 
such requirements could swamp the federal courts, Bikle sug-
gested that some "machinery" be established whereby such 
questions could be explored and pertinent factual records could 
be compiled before the matters found their way to federal court. 
Bikle pointed to the proceedings before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission as a possible model. Of course, as to many 
economic, industrial, commercial, and environmental activities, 
Bikle's proposal has proven prophetic. insofar as the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act 15 provides for judicial oversight of the 
massive federal bureaucracy currently regulating such matters. 
Far from all constitutional litigation flows through these chan-
nels, however. And the Court has never bound itself to the kind 
of "on the record" requirement Bikle proposed. 
So the issue Frankfurter and Bikle addressed not only out-
lived them but was fueled by the rise of the administrative state. 
Accordingly, after a period of neglect, the issue was again taken 
up, albeit sporadically. by some of the foremost constitutional 
11. Henry Wolf Bikl<~. Judicial Determination of Facts Affectilw the Constitllliona/ 
Validity of Legislative Action. 31-i HARV. L REV. 6. 6 ( 1924). 
12. See id. at 6-7. 
n See id. at 7. 
14. /d. at 21-22. 
15. 5 U.S.C §§ 551-59. 701-06 (2000). 
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scholars of the second half of the twentieth century. 16 A tho-
rough exploration of their work exceeds the narrow confines of a 
book review. Nonetheless. the particularly noteworthy contribu-
tions of Archibald Cox merit mention. The Harvard law profes-
sor and former U.S. Solicitor General published two articles in 
which he examined the relative capacities of Congress and the 
Supreme Court to determine legislative facts in human rights 
cases. 
Cox celebrated the Court"s Voting Rights Act rulings 
handed down in the October 1965 Term of the Court. In particu-
lar. he lauded the Justices' decision to borrow from commerce-
clause case law. and extend to the enforcement clauses of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, a "presumption that facts exist 
which sustain [congressional] legislation and ... [judicial] defe-
rence to conwessional judgment upon questions of degree and 
proportion." Cox also approved the Court's recognition of 
Congress's relative institutional strengths, among them a supe-
rior ability to determine questions of legislative fact, in devising 
means for the protection of core constitutional values. 18 Just five 
years later, however, Cox conceded that his earlier synthesis of 
the Court's cases had been overly optimistic. Upon reflection he 
found it '"hard to divine whether the Justices have developed a 
philosophy concerning the weight to be given legislative deter-
minations of fact, characterization, or degree in civil liberties 
cases.'' 19 a judgment as accurate today as when first spoken. So 
while the controversy surrounding judicial determination of leg-
islative facts in constitutional cases is an ancient one, the legal 
profession's understanding of it remains inadequate. 
II. JUST THE FACTS 
Faigman opens his book by discussing illustrative examples 
of judicial incoherence in the reception of constitutional facts. 
He makes a case study of the Supreme Court's efforts to deal 
16. See. e.g .. Dean Alfange. The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitlllional 
Law. 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637 (1966): Henry J. Friendly. The Courts and Social Policy: 
Substance and Procedure. 33 U. MIA\11 L. REV. 21 (1978): Karst. supra note 4: Henry P. 
Monaghan. Constitutional Fact Rel'in;-, 85 COLUM. L REV. 229 (1985): ArthurS. Miller 
& Jer~me A. Barron. The Supreme Court, the Adversary System. and the Flow of Infor-
mation to the Justices: A Preliminar\' Inquiry. 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975). 
17. Archibald Cox. The Supreme Court /965 Term-Foreword: Constitlltional Ad-
judication and the Promotion of Human Rights. 80 HARV. L. REV. 91. 107 (1966). 
lK /d. at 118-21. 
19. Archibald Cox. The Role of Congress in Constitlltional Determinations. 40 U. 
CI-;. L. RE\. 199. 213 (1971 ). 
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with the related questions of when. for constitutional purposes. 
human life begins and ends. He adeptly demonstrates that the 
relevant cases are utterly inconsistent in their treatment of ques-
tions of constitutional fact and reflect a more universal confusion 
about the way in which such questions should be resolved. 
Faigman follows this introduction with an examination of 
his subject's philosophical foundations. Specifically. he surveys 
the debate between scientific realists20 and their more skeptical 
critics. In doing so, Faigman both reveals his own (quite modest) 
starting assumptions and situates his project within a broader 
debate about the nature of human knowledge. As he explains, 
antirealists insist that facts and values are inextricably intert-
wined, whereas Faigman, like other scientific realists, maintains 
that "facts can exist independent of biasing influences" (p. 24). 
This makes possible the distinction between constitutional law 
and constitutional fact upon which his book is based. The conse-
quence of these assumptions is that lawyers and judges can and 
should "take facts seriously" (p. 24 ), even (especially?) when re-
levant to constitutional litigation. Put another way, Faigman ar-
gues that, because facts exist independent of the values of their 
beholders, courts have a duty to discover them, rather than just 
employ them "rhetorically. as premises that can be manipulated 
or massaged in the service of one or another legal outcome" (p. 
25). Throughout the book Faigman exposes the Supreme Court's 
relentless tendency to do the latter. 
The next four chapters constitute the heart of the book. 
wherein Faigman explains how and why the Court has dealt so 
carelessly with constitutional facts. This effort starts with a tax-
onomy of constitutional facts that improves upon the well-worn 
but highly influential distinction Kenneth Culp Davis made be-
tween adjudicative and legislative facts. 21 Insofar as the former 
class matters to constitutional rulings, Faigman denominates 
them "constitutional case-specific facts." He divides the latter 
class into two subcategories based on the function the facts per-
form in the court's constitutional analysis. "Constitutional doc-
trinal facts'' concern or even determine the content of legal rules 
that become tenets of constitutional law. "Constitutional review-
able facts," in contrast, relate to the application of legal rules to 
20. Scientific realists. discussed in the text. ought not be confused with legal realists. 
On the latter. see. for example. LAL.RA KAL\!A:\. LEGAL REA LIS\! AT YALE:~ 1927-1960 
(1986). 
21. See supra note 4. 
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particular circumstances, though such facts still transcend the 
parties presently before the court. Faigman acknowledges that 
these categories, while distinct in theory, are not always easy to 
distinguish in practice (pp. 46-49). 
A single area of First Amendment jurisprudence illustrates 
these distinctions. In explaining its decision to exclude "obsceni-
ty" from First Amendment protection, the Court has asserted 
that exposure to obscene material degrades the moral sensibili-
ties of the communit/2 and may even increase the incidence of 
antisocial behavior.13 These claims concern matters of legislative 
fact, because they extend beyond the parties to any particular 
obscenity prosecution. Within Faigman's taxonomy, they are 
constitutional doctrinal facts, because the Court asserts them in 
support of its choice of a legal rule, namely a free speech doc-
trine with an exception for obscene material. The Court has de-
fined obscenity to exclude material having "serious literary, ar-
tistic, political, or scientific value. "24 Whether a specific work is 
of sufficient value to exempt its authors. publishers, or distribu-
tors from liability, however, is a question of constitutional re-
viewable fact. It is legislative rather than adjudicative in nature 
because the Supreme Court has made it clear that the value of a 
work does not "vary from community to community."25 Thus. 
such a determination transcends any single obscenity prosecu-
tion. But because this factual issue concerns the application of an 
established legal standard rather than the announcement of a 
new one, it is, to use Faigman's terminology, a constitutional re-
viewable (rather than a doctrinal) fact. 26 
Faigman 's decision to classify different types of legislative 
facts according to the function they serve in constitutional analy-
sis is a sound one. As I argue below, however, this insight might 
profitably be taken even further. 
The next chapter, on the "Constitution's Frames of Refer-
ence." explores the ways in which the Supreme Court has mani-
pulated the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges 
to statutes in order to frame constitutional questions so as to fo-
22. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton. 413 U.S. 49. 59.63 (1973). 
23. See id. at 60. 
24. Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15. 24 (1973). 
25. Pope v. Illinois. 4R1 U.S. 497.500 (1987). 
26. The question. however. of the work's offensiveness. another requirement of the 
legal test for obscenitv. is limited to the specific geographical context of that particular 
pr'Osecution. See id. A~cordingly. such an issue concerns a constitutional case-specific fact 
(p. 57). 
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reordain their answers. These frames of reference matter for 
present purposes because they dictate the form issues of legisla-
tive fact take in constitutional cases. Case specific facts are most 
likely to be relevant to constitutional questions posed at a highly 
specific level of generality, whereas reviewable or even doctrinal 
facts are more likely to be pertinent to those asked and ans-
wered at a more abstract level.27 In United States v. Salerno, the 
Supreme Court insisted that a facial challenge to a statute may 
succeed only where ''no set of circumstances exists under which 
the act would be valid. "28 Faigman joins the majority of com-
mentators in dismissing Salerno's dictum as the product of ''ro-
mantic notions of a restrained judiciary" and "timeworn banali-
ties of judicial restraint" (pp. 65-66). In Part Ill, I argue that 
these banalities deserve more of a hearing than Constitutional 
Fictions accords them. 
In any event, Faigman insists that his critique "does not de-
pend upon a belief in expansive judicial authority" (p. 66). And 
he is surely correct to chastise the Court for its selective and in-
coherent application of the Salerno rule. Faigman argues that 
this confusion is merely one manifestation of the Court's more 
general inattention to the essential (but often implicit) selection 
of the appropriate level of generality for resolving constitutional 
controversies. He calls upon judges (especially Justices) and 
lawyers to be more self-aware in making these choices. As he 
demonstrates (pp. 73-78), their neglect has made possible much 
mischief, at times allowing courts to play a constitutional shell 
game. 
Assuming the constitutional fact issues have been properly 
framed, questions remain about the correct approach to their ini-
tial resolution by trial judges and subsequent reevaluation by 
appellate courts. These problems are the ones most in need of 
fixing, for as Faigman acknowledges the judiciary's practices in 
receiving and evaluating proof of legislative facts in constitution-
al cases are "chaotic," and "procedural guidelines and evaluative 
guideposts" are nonexistent (p. 98). At the trial-court level, tes-
timony offered as proof of legislative facts must satisfy the de-
manding standards of evidentiary rules, frequently including the 
27. As Faigman colorfully puts it. '"the question of what frame of reference to em-
ploy ... largely involves choosing between reviewable facts or case-specific facts as the 
denomination of constitutional currency'" (p. 97). 
28. 481 U.S. 739.745 (1986). 
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rigorous scrutiny applicable to expert witnesses. 29 On appeal, 
however, amici. who are under no obligation to demonstrate re-
levant expertise. file briefs packed with assertions of legislative 
fact. which may then be relied upon to justify reversal. Nor is the 
Court guided by any "overriding theory of when it should be de-
ferential to other bodies -judicial and nonjudicial-that have 
made findings of constitutional fact" (p. 114 ). This disorder has 
consequences. As Faigman rightly observes, the indeterminacy 
of modern constitutional law can to a significant extent be traced 
to the Court's refusal to recognize, let alone rationalize. the role 
legislative facts play in constitutional adjudication. The status 
quo maximizes the discretionary authority of the Justices to the 
detriment of fundamental rule of law values. 
But Faigman offers only the most modest and precatory so-
lutions. largely because he deems the present state of affairs to 
be inevitable. For example, he dismisses as "unrealistic and un-
helpful" pleas that assertions of legislative fact be subjected to 
the rigors of the adversarial process. His explanation is that be-
cause such assertions concern facts that "transcend any single lit-
igation. and thus have precedential import. the development of a 
factual record cannot be left to the parties" (p. 100).30 
Similarly. Faigman defends de novo judicial review of a leg-
islature's factual findings, at least where important constitutional 
rights are implicated. 31 He goes so far as to dismiss as essentially 
irrelevant considerations of comparative institutional compe-
tence. Though he nowhere explicitly says as much. these conclu-
sions apparently rest at least in part on an inchoate assumption 
of absolute judicial supremacy. Earlier in the book he demon-
strates that disputes about legislative facts ultimately concern the 
meaning of the Constitution (pp. 88-90). The implicit syllogism 
seems to be that ( 1) with a few exceptions, it is for the Court to 
tell the country what the Constitution means, (2) resolving issues 
of constitutional fact is a component of constitutional interpreta-
tion. and therefore (3) the Justices must enjoy the same freedom 
in deciding questions of constitutional fact that they enjoy in de-
ciding questions of law. Were the major premise relaxed to ac-
knowledge that other institutions also properly put flesh on the 
29. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc .. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
30. The possibility. however. deserves more discussion than he gives it. See infra 
Part IliA. 
31. But cf Note. Judicial Review of Congressional Factfinding. 122 HARV. L. REV. 
767. 767 (2008.) (concluding that the ··Court's lack of solicitousness to congressional fact-
finding is indefensible on both constitutional and prudential grounds"). 
2009] BOOK REVIEWS 477 
Constitution's bare bones. the conclusion would to that extent 
merit reconsideration. Faigman also stresses the ultimate need 
for uniform resolution of constitutional questions. which, he rea-
sons, precludes Supreme Court deferenc~ to what often amounts 
to a multiplicity of fact-finders (p. 116).02 Here again. however. 
there is more to constitutional facts than is dreamt of in Profes-
sor Faigman's philosophy. 
III. QUESTIONS NOT ASKED 
As the preceding synopsis shows, Constitutional Fictions 
vastly improves upon the pre-existing legal literature. By recog-
nizing the subject as one demanding trans-substantive examina-
tion, Faigman highlights for scholarly scrutiny a fundamental 
element of the actual practice of judicial review too often ig-
nored by judges and their critics. 
The book's most significant and original contribution is its 
insight that disputes about legislative facts in constitutional cases 
are really disputes about the meaning of the Constitution itself. 
Resolution of those disputes cannot be separated from the task 
of constitutional interpretation. Put more concretely. "[p ]art of 
the exposition of any constitutional rule should include a state-
ment of which party-the challenger or the State-has the bur-
den of proof [as to pertinent legislative facts] and at what level of 
proof that burden must be met" (p. 101). While this injunction 
may seem elementary, it connects issues of legislative fact to the 
work of constitutional interpretation in a clear, concise. and 
practical manner that significantly exceeds prior efforts. Moreo-
ver, were the injunction to be honored. it would effect dramatic 
change in the way constitutional cases are litigated and decided. 
Thus, the revelation of the relationship between constitutional 
facts and constitutional meaning was in itself a major achieve-
ment. 
Unfortunately, Faigman fails to explore the full ramifica-
tions of that observation. At several points in his analysis he in 
32. The emphasis here on the need for finalitv and uniformitv echoes one of the 
academic literature's more prominent arguments fo.r a strong version of judicial supre-
macy in constitutional interpretation. namely that such a role for the Court provides a 
means for settlement of otherwise persistent and divisive controversies. See, e.g. Larry 
Alexander & Frederick Schauer. On Extrajudicial Constiwtional Imerpretation. 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1359. 1371 (1997) (arguing that a strong version of judicial supremacv is 
necessary to fulfill the "settlement function of law"). · 
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effect treats this insight as the end, when in reality it is just the 
beginning, of analysis. Faigman tacitly assumes that the Supreme 
Court must have the pre-eminent role in assessing legislative 
facts in constitutional cases. He even rejects some efforts to re-
gularize or channel this function, apparently on the ground that 
judges. and especially Supreme Court Justices, must remain free 
to pursue these questions however they choose to do so. He rea-
sons that •·[j]ust as no court would defer to the parties to say 
what the law is. no court should rely on the parties exclusively to 
say what the reviewable facts are" (p. 100). 
But the analogy goes only so far. Whereas judges are pro-
fessional referees of legal reasoning. they can lay no similar 
claim to expertise about the wide array of empirical questions 
that come before them. Those questions run the gamut of social 
and scientific knowledge. To rely upon judges, especially appel-
late judges limited by the record created below, to know or dis-
cover the answers to these questions is at least as problematic as 
relying upon the parties to do so. There must be better answers 
to this problem. 
A. THE REMAND OPTION 
On occasion the Supreme Court has, when confronted with 
a dispositive but disputed question of legislative fact, remanded 
the constitutional case to the trial court with directions to sup-
plement the formal evidentiary record. The Court's 1994 and 
1997 Turner Broadcasting decisions33 illustrate this approach. At 
issue there was the constitutionality of the "'must-carry" provi-
sions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Compe-
tition Act of 1992. which required cable television providers to 
dedicate a portion of their channels to carrying local broadcast 
television stations.34 Congress imposed this requirement to pro-
tect local broadcasters from cable companies, which, Congress 
had concluded. increasingly enjoyed monopoly status in most 
markets. 35 
Shortly after the Act became law, numerous cable operators 
and programmers filed suit in federal court claiming that the 
must-carry provisions violated the Free Speech and Press Claus-
33. Turner Broadcasting Sys .. Inc. v. FCC (Turner /1). 520 U.S. 180 (1997): Turner 
Broadcasting Sys .. Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1). 512 U.S. 622 (1994 ). 
34. Turner I at 626. 
35. /d. at 623: see also Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act 
of 1992. Pub. L. No. 102-385 § 2(a)(16). 106 Stat. 1460. 1461 (1992). 
2009] BOOK REVIEWS 479 
es of the First Amendment.36 After a three-judge district court 
rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge and upheld the 
Act,37 the plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court. 
Even though the Court affirmed the district court's decision to 
apply the more deferential "intermediate level of scrutiny appli-
cable to content-neutral restrictions,"38 the Court nevertheless 
vacated the district court's decision granting summary judgment 
in favor of the government.39 The Court "ha[ d] no difficulty con-
cluding" that Congress's asserted interests in preserving free, 
over-the-air local broadcast television and promoting fair com-
petition in the television industry constituted "important go-
vernmental interest[s]" for the pu'Poses of intermediate scrutiny 
when ''viewed in the abstract. "4 Nevertheless the Court re-
manded because "[ o ]n the state of the record developed thus 
far," it could neither confirm nor reject Congress's prediction 
that the economic viability of local broadcast television would be 
threatened absent the Act's must-carry requirements.41 
On remand, after the parties put "reams of paper''42 before 
the district court, the judges again ruled for the government.43 
The plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.44 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Kennedy found that the "expanded 
record"45 assuaged the Court's prior doubts about the reasona-
bleness of Congress's perception that broadcast television faced 
a serious threat and Congress's judgment that must-carry rules 
constituted a measured response. 
A remand for development of the record relating to an issue 
of legislative fact in a constitutional case is unusual, at least out-
side of the administrative-agency context. But the two Turner 
decisions show that it can be and relatively recently has been 
done. This procedure is, of course, time consuming as well as 
burdensome on the parties and the courts. Still, to the extent 
36. Turner/.512U.S.at634. 
37. Pursuant to the Act"s command. a three-judge district court was convened in 
response to the constitutional challenge to the must-carry provisions. See § 23. 106 Stat. 
at 1500. 
38. Turner I. 512 U.S. at 662. 
39. /d. at 668. 
40. /d. at 663. 
41. /d. at 665. 
42. Turner Broadcasting v. FCC. 910 F. Supp. 734. 739 (D.D.C. 1995). 
43. /d. 
44. Justice Breyer. who had replaced Justice Blackmun in the interim. voted to af-
firm. Turner II. 520 U.S. at 225 (Breyer. J .. concurring in part). 
45. /d. at 195. 
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that it promotes a more empirically rigorous constitutional juri-
sprudence, it might be well worth the cost.46 The possibility that 
this method should be employed more frequently at least de-
serves careful consideration in a book dedicated to presenting a 
"procedural blueprint for constitutional fact-finding" (p. 159). 
Faigman, however. accords the issue no more than a passing ref-
erence, and implicitly rejects the approach without elaboration. 
More needs to be said before a process combining the virtues of 
the adversarial system with the judicial hierarchy necessary to a 
uniform interpretation of the Constitution is put out of mind. 
B. FACTS' FUNCTIONS 
Faigman properly divides legislative facts into the subcate-
gories "doctrinal" and "reviewable," depending upon the func-
tion the facts play in judicial analysis (pp. 46-47). A functional 
taxonomy, however. could profitably be developed further. Just 
as not all legislative facts are alike, neither are all doctrinal or 
reviewable facts. 
As to the former, which a court employs in formulating a 
governing legal rule, Faigman gives as illustrative examples his-
torical questions relevant to an originalist approach to constitu-
tional interpretation and social-science questions relevant to in-
terpretative claims based on constitutional structure. As he 
correctly notes, determining doctrinal facts is a component part 
of judicial lawmaking. From this Faigman argues that judges 
must remain free to discover such facts unfettered by the limits 
of the adversarial process. To be sure, it is hard to quarrel with 
the notion that "[j]ust as a judge might retire to the library to re-
search a line of cases, a judge might consult The Federalist' 
when considering what foundational principles underlie the Su-
premacy Clause.'' Nor would many argue that a "judge who 
reads a biography of Alexander Hamilton or a history of the 
New Deal Court" ought not "apply this newfound knowledge to 
his or her constitutional cases," (p. 89) though there is something 
slightly discomfiting about the idea that results in constitutional 
cases might turn on the content of a judge's summer reading 
list.47 Faigman ultimately concludes that "traditional notions sur-
46. See John 0. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney. Judging Facts Like Law. 25 
Co:o;sT. COMME:\T. 69. 126 (2008) (arguing that an appellate court should .. remand [a] 
case to the lower court for consideration of a dispositive factual issue that the appellate 
court believes was missed or for reconsideration of an issue which. in the view of the ap-
pellate court. needs further evidentiary vetting .. ). 
47. Cf Li:\DA GREENHOCSE. BECOMI~G JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY 
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rounding evidence and burdens of proof are largely inapposite in 
the case of constitutional doctrinal facts" (p. 88). In the contexts 
he highlights-matters of history or political science-this con-
clusion seems largely unobjectionable. 
But, as Faigman notes. doctrinal facts take other forms as 
well. In Washington v. Glucksberg.48 for example. Justice Souter 
concurred in the Court's judgment rejecting a claimed right to 
physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill. Souter empha-
sized, however, that the Court might reconsider the issue were it 
subsequently presented with evidence that such a right would 
not create an intolerable risk of euthanasia or coerced suicide.49 
Pointing to the legality of physician-assisted suicide in the Neth-
erlands, Souter took notice of a considerable debate as to the 
lessons of the Dutch experience. 5° For him that debate counseled 
caution for the time being. He stressed. however, that "[t]he day 
may come when we can say with some assurance which side is 
right," 51 and thus he did not reject respondents' constitutional 
claim "for all time. "52 In the meantime, though, he was content 
to leave the issue with state legislatures. which he noted enjoyed 
significant institutional advantages in exploring such questions.53 
Souter's opinion raises issues Faigman might have ex-
amined- namely, whether, and. if so, when it is appropriate for 
a court to defer a constitutional ruling in a justiciable case be-
cause of the sort of factual uncertainty that proved dispositive to 
Souter in Glucksberg. Of course. this question then raises a co-
rollary one about the proc_edural and decisional rules appropri-
ate in such circumstances.)4 While it might be tempting to dis-
BLACKMUN'S SUPREME COL'RT JOURNEY H3. 90-91 (2005) (describing Justice Black-
mun's summer visit to the Mavo Clinic librarv and dinner-table discussion with his 
daughters about abortion while drafting the Couit's opinion in Roe v. Wade). 
48. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
49. !d. at 782 (Souter.J.. concurring in the judgment). 
50. /d. at 786. 
51. /d. For contrasting views as to the lessons to be drawn from the first decade un-
der Oregon's assisted-suicide statute. compare Kathryn L. Tucker. In rhe Lahorarory of 
rhe Srares: The Progress of Glucksberg·s Im·irmion ro Srmes ro Address End-of-Life 
Choice. 106 MICH. L. REV. 1593. 1603 (2008) (concluding that the "experience in O~eg~n 
has demonstrated that a carefully drafted law does not put patients at risk"). wirh Her-
bert Hendin & Kathleen Foley. Physician-Assisred Suicide in Oregon: A Medical Perspec-
rive. 106 MICH. L. REV. 1613. 1614 (2008) (finding that "the implementation of the law 
has had unintended. harmful consequences for patients"). 
52. Glucksberg. 521 U.S. at 789 (Souter.J.. concurring in the judgment). 
53. /d. 
54. Roper v. Simmons is another recent case wherein a disputable social-science 
conclusion apparently affected the Court's choice among potential doctrinal rules. 543 
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miss Souter"s musings as eccentric. the Court's modern constitu-
tional jurisprudence suggests t~_at the only eccentric aspect of 
Souter's opinion was its candor.)) In any event. this example illu-
strates that not all doctrinal facts present the same challenges to 
the legal system. The undisciplined approach to legislative facts 
that seems unobjectionable in the context of interpreting The 
Federalist Papers becomes more suspect when applied to more 
deeply empirical questions. such as the ones with which Souter 
wrestled in Glucksberg. 
Reviewable facts could likewise be usefully divided into 
subcategories. Distinguishing among types of reviewable facts 
based on the various functions they serve in judicial analysis 
might suggest reasons courts should approach different catego-
ries of fact differently. As Faigman notes. issues of reviewable 
fact are ubiquitous in modern constitutional law (p. 98). In some 
cases. the result turns on the existence of (or the rationality of 
co1_1pessional belief in) facts necessary to trigger federal authori-
ty.) In others. courts question whether intrusions upon recog-
nized individual rights are justifiable as an effective solution57 to 
a real and sufficiently serious social problem.58 Sometimes judi-
cial discussion of reviewable facts in truth has less to do with 
empirical assertions than with judgments about constitutional 
values. 59 Elsewhere. concerns about reviewable facts take the 
form of judicial imposition of procedural hurdles for legislatures. 
C.S. 551 (2005 ). See Deborah \\'. Denno. The Sciemific Shorrcomings of Roper v. Sim-
mon-.. 3 OHIO ST. J. CRI\1. L. 379. 379 (2006) (contending "that some of the case law and 
social science research that form the basis for the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Roper L Simmons are insufficient and outdated"). 
55. U Atwater\. Citv of La go Vista. 532 U.S. 31R. 353 n.25 (2001) (Souter. J.) (de-
clining im·itation to impose' Fourth Amendment limit on the power of a police officer to 
arrest for non-violent misdemeanors in part because "there simply is no evidence of 
widespread abuse of minor-offense arrest authority"). 
5h. See, e.g .. Gonzales v. Raich. 545 U.S. 1 (2005): United States\'. Morrison. 529 
l'.S. 591'\ (2000): Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank. 
5:!.7 C.S. 6'27 ( 1999): Citv of Boerne v. Flores. 521 U.S. 507 (1997): United States v. Lo-
pez. 514 U.S. 549 ( 1995). 
57. See, e.g .. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union. 542 U.S. 656 (2003): Reno v. 
Am. Civil Liberties Cnion. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
51'1. See supra notes 33--45 and accompanying text. 
59. Arguablv the infamous footnote 11 in Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the 
Court in Br~wn v: Board of Education belongs in this category. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See, 
e.g .. David L. Faigman. Fact-Finding in Constitlltional Cases. in How LAW KNOWS 166 
n.52 (Austin Sarat et al. ed .. 2007) (noting that the "question whether the social science 
cited in Brmm was truly relied upon by the Court has been debated ever since the opi-
nion was announced" and that "[m]ost commentators have concluded that the studies 
were a makeweight for a conclusion reached on other grounds"). 
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the apparent aim of which is to ensure legislative deliberation 
about the constitutional question. 60 
The wide variety of functions reviewable facts serve in con-
stitutional cases at least invites consideration of the possibility 
that different procedural rules and standards of proof. as well as 
different standards for appellate review. might be most appro-
priate in these different contexts. No scholar has of yet accepted 
that invitation. 
C. JUDICIAL GOVERNMENT 
Greater attention should be paid to alternative procedures 
for appellate judicial decision of debatable questions of legisla-
tive facts in constitutional cases. But judicial resolution of such 
questions. whatever form it may take. still raises fundamental is-
sues about the role of judicial review in our constitutional order. 
Most modern constitutional scholars probably take as a giv-
en a pre-eminent role for the judiciary in constitutional interpre-
tation, but not all do. 61 The first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury has witnessed the reinvigoration of the age-old debate 
between judicial supremacists and their critics. 61 The former pre-
sume that judicial review provides both an indispensable check-
ing function on the political branches63 and a necessary means 
for settlement of discord between them.n4 in effect producing 
nO. See generall1· A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone. Remanding ro 
Congress: The Supreme Cour(s Ne~<.· "On rhe Record" Consrirurional Rn·ieu· of Federal 
Srarures. iln CoR~ ELL L. REV. 32k (20<Jl ). 
nl. Michael Stokes Paulsen. The lrrepressihle Jfrrh o(Marbury. 101 MICH. L. RE\'. 
270n. 2700--07 (2003) (describing preYalent assumption of judicial supremacy in constitu-
tional interpretation). 
n2. See Dawn E. Johnsen. Funcrional Deparrmenralism and .Vonjudicial f!ller-
prerarion: Who Derermines Consrirurional /1.feaning 1 . n7 LAW & CO\,;TE\IP. PROBS. 105. 
105 (2004) (''One of the vibrant constitutional debates at the turn of the twentY-first cen-
tury concerns enduring questions about the appropriate role of nonjudicial· entities-
especially Congress and the President -in the deYelopment of constitutional meaning ... ). 
See, e.g. LARRY D. KRA\IER. THE PEOPLE THE\ISEL\ES (2<XJ4): Larrv D. Kramer. The 
Supreme Courr 2000 Term Foreu·ord: We The Courr. 115 HAR\'. L. RE\'. 4 (2<XJI ): SYm-
posium. Theories o( Taking rhe Consrirwion Serious!r Owside rhe Courrs. 73 FORDHA\1 
L. RE\'. 1341 (2005): Symposium. The People lhem.l~l,·e.\: Popular Consrirwionali.1m and 
Judicial Review. ill CHi.-KEt--;T L. RE\'. H09 (200n). 
n3. See GEOFFREY R. STO'-iE. ET AL.. Co-.;STITL TIO\,;AL LAW kn (5th ed. 2005) 
(noting argument that judicial reYiew "rest[s] on the broader ground that the Supreme 
Court was accorded a distinctiYe role as the guarantor of the supremacy of the Constitu-
tion as against the states and the federal legislature"). -
04. See Alexander & Schauer. supra note 32. at 1371. 
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what might more aptly be termed judicial exclusivitl5 or judicial 
sovereignty. 66 
A book review is no place to resolve this debate. The point 
here. rather. is that the dilemma posed by constitutional cases 
turning on issues of legislative fact cannot be considered apart 
from the on-going debate about the extent of the authority judi-
cial review legitimately confers upon the courts. Even more im-
portantly. the prevalence and significance of legislative facts in 
constitutional adjudication might have important lessons for the 
debate over judicial supremacy, at least with respect to some 
categories of constitutional questions. The problematic nature of 
judicial determination of legislative facts, reflected in the failure 
of the Justices to develop principles to guide appellate courts in 
their reception and decision. should be a major consideration in 
that debate. To the poverty of judicial procedures should be 
added concerns about the severe constraints on judicial compe-
tence to resolve issues of legislative fact. Faigman reasons that, 
because appellate courts cannot with confidence rely on the par-
ties to provide sufficient evidence of legislative facts. they must 
be allowed the submissions of amici, who admittedly may lack 
any claim to relevant expertise and largely escape the rigors of 
the adversarial process. He also asserts that, because the submis-
sions of amici will not always suffice, judges must be free to con-
duct their own investigations (p. 100). 
Of course one could as easily stand this reasoning on its 
head. That existing litigation procedures at best awkwardly allow 
for inquiry into legislative facts provides a reason for judges to 
shy away from deciding such questions. How might this be done? 
An exhaustive discussion lies outside the scope of a book review. 
Thus for present purposes it must suffice to list some of the poss-
ible means not considered in Constitutional Fictions. 
The Court might eschew standards and balancing tests in 
favor of more rules-based approaches that would depend less on 
the kinds of empirical judgments that strain the judiciary's ca-
pacity. The Court might more assiduously avoid facial challenges 
to statutes, thereby limiting (though to be sure not eliminating) 
65. See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher. Judicial Exclush·ity and Political Instability. 84 
VA. L. REV. 83 (1998) (discussing. and resisting. the arguments for judicial exclusivity in 
interpretation of the Constitution). 
66. See Kramer. supra note 62. at 13 ("There is ... a world of difference between 
having the last word and having the only word: between judicial supremacy and judicial 
sover~ignty."). 
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the significance of a ruling for parties not before the Court.67 
Stricter adherence to "case or controversy" requirements such as 
standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine 
might defer or avoid confrontation with constitutional issues that 
turn on legislative facts. 68 A greater appreciation for the roles 
that other governmental institutions play in the creation of con-
stitutional law might justify reliance on those institutions to in-
vestigate questions of legislative fact relevant to at least some 
categories of constitutional issues.69 With respect to such issues, 
the Court might give greater deference to the even implicit de-
terminations of legislative facts that underlie, and support the 
constitutionality of, the actions of co-ordinate branches of the 
federal government or of the States. At a minimum, the Court's 
limited capacity to find complex legislative facts counsels in fa-
vor of greater efforts to rationalize the method by which they are 
proven in litigation. 
The point is not that all, or even any, of these options would 
come without costs, which in some cases might prove prohibi-
tive, but just that they deserve much more consideration than 
they have hitherto been given. Such consideration might even 
supply an area of mediation between the contending sides of the 
otherwise stale and stalled debate setting judicial restraint 
against activism. In any event, some approaches might prove 
more sound in some categories of constitutional cases than in 
others. For example, Faigman appropriately stresses that with 
respect to individual rights guarantees the judiciary serves as a 
bulwark against majoritarian tyranny (p. 124 ). In cases concern-
67. To be sure. Faigman explicitly rejects this notion as the product of unduly ··ro-
mantic notions of a restrained judiciary·· (p. 65). though my point here is that he may be 
too swift to reach that conclusion. 
68. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL. THE LEAST DA:"'GEROCS BRA:"'CH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 115-16 (2nded. !962) (discussing functions 
served by non-justiciability doctrines). But c(. Heather Elliot. The Functions of Standing. 
61 STAN. L. REV. 459. 464 (2008) (urging. as an alternative to standing analysis. a ··vi-
brant abstention doctrine that permits [the Court] to pursue its separation-of-powers 
goals'"). 
69. For example. Archibald Cox urged the Court to recognize and defer to the 
unique capacity of Congress to effectuate the promises of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments. which not coincidentally expressly authorized their enforcement by Congress. See 
supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text: see also David Cole. The Value of Seeing 
Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights. 
1997 SLJP. CT. REV. 31. 34 (1997): Michael W. McConnell. Institutions and Interpreta-
tions: A Critique of Boerne v. Flores. Ill HARV. L. REV. !53 ( 1997). But see Jav S. Bv-
bee. Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress. Section 5. and the Religio;ts 
Freedom Restoration Act. 48 V A:'-10. L. REV. 1539. 1624 ( 1995 ). 
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ing these rights, the courts may find it difficult to carry out their 
counter-majoritarian function without independently evaluating 
evidence concerning relevant legislative facts. 
But not all constitutional cases require the courts to protect 
minorities by checking majorities. In important categories of 
cases, it is at the least not obvious that counter-majoritarian con-
cerns play any significant role. As Madison famously argued,70 
and as the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments71 apparently assumed, national majorities may prove sin-
gularly effective in checking abusive majorities at the state or lo-
cal level. Where Congress acts in just such an effort, independent 
judicial reconsideration of predicate legislative facts may be less 
appropriate than in the paradigmatic individual rights case.72 
Recognition of this distinction might do more than divide the 
Constitution into rights and powers provisions, as some have 
urged the Court to do,73 though to be sure a focus on the dilem-
ma legislative facts pose for the courts may provide added sup-
port for such arguments. The Court would not necessarily have 
to abdicate all efforts to safeguard the separation of powers and 
federalism were it to acknowledge that it should avoid doing so 
by rejecting Congress's judgment about matters of legislative 
fact, especially where the Constitution's framers arguably ex-
pected Congress to take the lead. That legislative facts are espe-
cially likely to be imbued with value judgments may in these 
kinds of cases make deference to Congress even more appropri-
ate, if as some have argued,74 the most compelling interpretation 
of the Reconstruction Amendments grants Congress a lead role 
in fashioning appropriate remedies. 
Lines might also be drawn based on the role issues of legis-
lative fact play in the constitutional analysis. As noted above,75 
legislative facts have been made to serve a wide range of func-
70. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 5: U.S. CONST. 
amend. XV.§ 2. 
72. But cf Flores. 521 U.S. 507 (1997): Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena. 515 U.S. 
200 (1995). 
73. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth .. 469 U.S. 528. 551 n.11 (1985): 
see also JESSIE H. CHOPER. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 
175-IR4 (1980): D. Bruce La Pierre. The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: lnter-
gm-ernmental Imnwnitv and the States as Agents of the Nation. 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 
( 19R2): Herbert Wechsler. The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government. 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 
(1954 ). 
74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
75. See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text. 
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tions in constitutional cases. Judicial dependence upon a legisla-
ture's, or a lower court's, evidentiary record might be acceptable 
in cases turning on the existence of facts triggering federal legis-
lative authority. But that dependence might be unacceptable in 
cases concerning core individual rights. In any event, these pos-
sibilities deserve study in any effort to provide a comprehensive 
treatment of constitutional facts. 
CONCLUSION 
These criticisms should not obscure the significant contribu-
tion Constitutional Fictions makes to our understanding of the 
role legislative facts play in constitutional cases. Prior efforts 
were for the most part limited to discrete doctrinal categories. 
By devoting a monograph to a sustained and trans-substantive 
consideration of the issue, Faigman in effect identifies a funda-
mentally different problem than the ones most prior studies have 
examined. The few instances of previous scholarly attention to 
the issue as Faigman framed it treated all legislative facts alike. 
By distinguishing doctrinal from reviewable facts, Faigman not 
only assists analysis of appropriate procedures but also clarifies 
the relationship between lawmaking and fact-finding. Others can 
now build on that distinction to construct a theory even more 
reflective of the full range of nuance implicated by judicial de-
termination of legislative facts. 
Faigman drills beneath the surface to disclose that the dis-
pute concerning judicial reception of legislative facts is but a part 
of the debate between scientific realists and their skeptics. Con-
stitutional Fictions also demonstrates that judicial manipulation 
of frames of reference and paths of proof create both confusion 
and opportunities for mischief. Finally, by exposing the inconsis-
tency between the Court's pronouncements and its practice con-
cerning deference to legislatures' findings of legislative facts, 
Constitutional Fictions invites efforts to understand this 
longstanding tension. Indeed, the book's most substantial con-
tribution may be to reveal how much analytical work remains to 
be done. 
